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1 Introduction
Winning a competition may result not only in a prize, but also in an ad-
vantage in subsequent competitions. Consider, for example, competitions
for research grants. While the successful applicant for a grant may harvest
all the direct benefits that the research money awarded provides, there
may also be an extra benefit from winning: carrying out the research that
the original grant facilitates makes for increased chances to win in future
grant competitions. In this way, an early competition for a prize implies
that there will be advantaged and disadvantaged participants in subsequent
competitions: winning an early contest gives you a head start in later con-
tests. Questions are then how contestants’ incentives to put in effort in
such sequential competitions vary over time as successes and failures are
recorded, and how these incentives interact in the shaping and development
of head starts.
In order to understand the dynamics of this kind of competition, we
develop in this paper a two-player model of a series of contests where, in
each stage contest, there is a prize to win of common value. A player
wins a stage contest by having a larger score than the opponent, where a
player’s score consists of effort in the current contest and the number of
contests that the player has won so far; we modify the number of wins by
a parameter that captures the importance of winning, and this is assumed
identical for the players.1 Hence, the player with larger number of wins has
a head start in any stage contest since he can win now even when investing
less effort than the rival. We point out two forces that interact in explaining
contestants’incentives across time. On one hand, there is a large incentive
to be the player with the head start since this can save effort costs in the
future without necessarily reducing the probability of success. However,
the head start creates an asymmetry which lowers both players’incentives
to put in effort, but more so for the disadvantaged player —the laggard.
This is because the head start enables the advantaged player —the leader
—to lay back a bit and still stand a good chance to win again, so that also
the laggard pulls back somewhat.
On the other hand, there is an additional value of being the leader.
A new win means he will also be a leader in the future, while a win for
the laggard will at best even the score. The difference in value between
winning and losing at each stage is therefore larger for the leader than
for the laggard. A win for the laggard will at best even the score (with
an expected payoff of zero), and a loss means that the laggard is still at
a disadvantage (with the same expected payoff of zero). This dampens
the laggard’s incentives to put in effort. However, the value of winning
1Clark and Nilssen (2018) consider a series of two all-pay auctions in which the value
of winning the first contest can give the players different head starts in the second.
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and continuing as leader falls over time in a game of finite length, simply
because there are fewer future contests left; hence, even the leader will put
in less effort at some stage in the contest sequence. This encourages the
laggard who, towards the end of the sequence of contests, will be the high
performer. The balance of these effects —and the interplay between them
—cannot be captured in a one-shot game with a head start.
Above, we mentioned the advantage that winning a current research
grant can convey on the winner in future competitions. It is the actual fact
of winning that creates the advantage here; whether an application is a little
better or much better than that of the opponent is not relevant. Winning
an early grant, and being able to carry out a research program, enhances
the chance to win again in the competition for later grants. Winning gives
a player a head start in the next contest. This can also be expected to occur
in a number of other contexts. In sales-force management, it is customary
to give awards to the Seller of the Month and the like. And in such sales
forces, it is not uncommon for the more successful agents to be given less
administrative duties, better access to back-offi ce resources, more training
than the less successful, and better territories; see, e.g., Skiera and Albers
(1998), Farrell and Hakstian (2001), and Krishnamoorthy, et al. (2005).
Being a winning salesperson gives a head start in later contests.
In our model, winning creates a head start advantage. Another strand
of the literature considers that winning agents have access to different prizes
than less successful ones (Megidish and Sela, 2014). Also a psychological
momentum may accrue to winners (Krumer, 2013). Experiments carried
out by Eriksson, et al. (2009) indicate that laggards keep on fighting.
In particular, the authors compare laggards who get feedback, i.e., are
informed that they are lagging, with ones who do not get such feedback
and find that informed laggards are more prone to put in effort. This finding
fits well with our theoretical predictions if we view winning a competition
in these experiments as getting a momentum before later competitions.
The sequence of contests that we model in this paper gives, as noted,
rise to the creation of a leader and a laggard by which the winner of an
early contest gets an advantage in the next one. Such dynamic win effects,
in various forms, are also discussed by Krumer (2013), Megidish and Sela
(2014), and Clark, et al. (2018). Krumer’s (2013) discussion is in the
context of a race, whereas the other two papers are on sequences of Tullock
contests. These contributions are confined to analyzing sequences of two
stage competitions. In the present study, on the other hand, we allow for
longer sequences, and the stage contest is an all-pay auction. With long
sequences of contests, we are able to discuss how the interaction of the
leader and the laggard’s incentives develop over time.
Leaders and laggards also feature in races, i.e., best-of-t contests, where
the overall winner is the first to win t stage contests; see Harris and Vickers
3
(1987) for an early analysis and Konrad (2009) for an overview.2 The
winner of the first stage of a race becomes the leader in the second, in
the sense of having fewer stages left to complete the game. This leader
has a much firmer grip on the rest of the game than the leader has in
our context. Results differ in the two set-ups, not surprisingly. While the
laggard is strongly discouraged in a race, he is much more interested in
staying and keep on fighting in our setting.
Strumpf (2002), Konrad and Kovenock (2009, 2010), Fu, et al. (2015),
and Konrad (2018) show various ways in which the discouragement of the
laggard can be mitigated in a race. In Strumpf (2002), this happens when
the contests most valuable to the laggard are late in the race; in Konrad and
Kovenock (2009), it happens because of the introduction of stage prizes; in
Konrad and Kovenock (2010) because of the introduction of uncertainty; in
Fu, et al. (2015) because of the introduction of team competition; and in
Konrad (2018) because of players having fixed budgets over the sequence of
contests. In these papers, there is no dynamic win effect. While the discour-
agement of the laggard is mitigated, he never exerts the higher expected
effort, as he eventually does in our analysis. Of these papers, Konrad and
Kovenock (2009) is particularly closely related to the present work, and we
therefore include a more detailed discussion of this relationship in Section
6 below.
Gelder (2014), on the other hand, shows, in his analysis of a race, that
a combination of punishment from loss and discounting creates a scope for
what he calls “last stand” behavior. This resembles our result that the
laggard exerts the higher expected effort in the final period, and often also
earlier. Gelder thus establishes an equilibrium outcome similar to ours, but
in a model of a race where the laggard’s position, and therefore also his
incentives, are different from our model. In addition, we get this outcome
even when there is no discounting.
Bergerhoff and Vosen (2015) introduce reference-dependent preferences
and find this to create what they call turn-around equilibria, where the dis-
advantaged player has the higher probability of winning.3 In our analysis,
preferences are standard, and while the laggard exerts the higher expected
effort towards the end of the game, his probability of winning is always
lower than that of the leader.
A phenomenon related to the dynamic win effect that we consider here
are dynamic effort effects, where efforts in an early contest, rather than
2Another interesting multi-period situation creating a leader and a laggard is the
incumbency competition, where the winner of contest t becomes the leader at contest
t+ 1; see, e.g., Ofek and Sarvary (2003) and Mehlum and Moene (2006, 2016).
3This study relates to Berger and Pope’s (2011) study of winning laggards in pro-
fessional baseball, and to Tong and Leung (2002), who use behavioral assumptions to
explain higher efforts by laggards.
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winning it, gives a player benefits later on. Clark and Nilssen (2013) in-
terpret this as learning by doing in a two-stage contest model. Relatedly,
Kovenock and Roberson (2009) and Joffrion and Parreiras (2013) model a
dynamic advantage as a function of a player’s past net effort, i.e., his ef-
fort over and above that of the other player. In Kovenock and Roberson’s
(2009) two-contest model, a high net effort in the first contest will, with
some decay, give a player a head start in the second. Joffrion and Parreiras
(2013) model a single all-pay auction carried out in multiple rounds, with
players’effort costs in each round being convex and players observing their
standings, i.e., the leader’s head start, after each round. These papers
consider a different strategic setting to us since, in the early contests, the
margin of victory is important; our model limits the amount of advantage
that can be gained from winning, and this is independent of previous ef-
forts. A key issue in papers with effort advantage is how transferable effort
is between time periods, i.e., the amount that current effort decays in fu-
ture rounds. We do not have effort spillovers between contests, and the
rate of catching up or lead enhancement is exogenously fixed; hence the
effect of a pure win advantage can be examined.
Our analysis of the development of incentives and head starts over time
is based on a stage game consisting of a complete-information two-player
all-pay auction with one player having two advantages: both a head start
and a higher valuation of winning. Head starts in a single contest —with
and without heterogeneous valuations among the players —have been an-
alyzed by several authors, notably by Konrad (2002), Meirowitz (2008),
Kirkegaard (2012), Li and Yu (2012), Hirata (2014), Segev and Sela (2014),
Siegel (2014), and Franke, et al. (2018). Among these papers, Konrad
(2002) and Hirata (2014) discuss two-stage situations where players can
take actions in the first stage that create head starts in the second stage,
while Li and Yu (2012) and Franke, et al. (2018) discuss the principal’s op-
timal choice of head start in a single contest in order to maximize expected
effort. In contrast, we look at how head starts develop over time from an
initially symmetric situation when the experience of winning gives a head
start in future contests. We explore the interlinkage between the size of
the head start and the derived heterogeneity in the players’valuations of
winning at a certain stage contest.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief analysis of
a single-stage contest with a head start. Section 3 sets up the model of
the sequence of contests and solves for the equilibrium. Section 4 gives
an analysis of the intensity of fighting in the sequence of contests and the
relative efforts of the competitors. In Section 5, we present a number of
extensions to our analysis. In particular, we discuss win advantages that
are combinations of head start and handicapping in Section 5.1, the effect
of players’discounting future payoffs in Section 5.2, and games where stage
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prizes vary across time in Section 5.3. Section 6 offers a discussion of our
main results and concludes. The proofs of our results in Sections 3 and
4 are in the Appendix, whilst the proofs for Section 5 are in an online
appendix.
2 Preliminaries: A single contest with a head
start
Before we introduce the series of contests in our main framework, it is
instructive to first look at one. Consider a single all-pay auction in which
two players h and k compete, by making irreversible efforts xh and xk, over
a prize of value vh = v + a for player h and vk = v for player k, where
v > 0 and a ≥ 0. Each player has a cost of 1 per unit effort, and efforts are
translated into a score for each player in the contest by the following rule:
the score of player h is z+xh (z ≥ 0), and the score of player k is xk.4 The
player with the higher score wins the contest, and ties are broken randomly
with each player having probability 1
2
of winning, so that the probability
that player h wins is
ph (xh, xk; z) =

1 if z + xh > xk;
1
2
if z + xh = xk;
0 if z + xh < xk.
(1)
Player h is advantaged in the sense of having a head start (z) and a larger
value of winning the prize (by the amount a). The expected payoff of the
two players is then
πh (xh, xk; z) = ph (xh, xk; z) (v + a)− xh,
πk (xh, xk; z) = (1− ph (xh, xk; z)) v − xk.
Let Fh(x) be the cumulative distribution function of player h’s mixed
strategy, i.e., Fh(x) is the probability that player h has an effort at or below
x. Fk(x) is defined similarly. The following Proposition characterizes the
unique Nash equilibrium.5
Proposition 1 i) If z ≥ v, then xh = xk = 0.
4We can think of the players as choosing a score in the contest rather than an effort.
The score cost of player h is then 0 up to score z and increasing per unit effort after
that, whereas the score cost is linearly increasing from 0 for player k.
5The Proposition is proved in Clark and Riis (1995). The case of a = 0 is proved in
Konrad (2002). See also Meirowitz (2008), Hirata (2014), Siegel (2014), Franke, et al.
(2018), and our online appendix.
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ii) If z ∈ [0, v), then the unique mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the









, xk ∈ [0, z) ,
xk+a
v+a
, xk ∈ [z, v] .
(3)
In this equilibrium, the expected efforts of the players are
x∗h (z, a) =
(v − z)2
2v
, and x∗k (z, a) =
v2 − z2
2 (v + a)
; (4)
expected payoffs are
π∗h (z, a) = z + a, and π
∗
k (z, a) = 0; (5)
and probabilities of winning are
p∗h (z, a) = 1−
v2 − z2
2v (v + a)
,
p∗k (z, a) =
v2 − z2
2v (v + a)
.
Note that the expected payoff of the disadvantaged player is p∗kv−x∗k =





We see from (5) that the advantaged player has a larger expected payoff
from the contest. He has the larger probability of winning in equilibrium
since he starts with a positive score at no cost. It can easily be verified
that p∗h (z, a) ≥ p∗k (z, a), with equality only if z = a = 0. Note also that
the support of the distribution of effort for player h is [0, v − z], whereas
the support for the corresponding distribution of h’s contest score is [z, v].
In what follows, we shall be interested in the relative efforts of the
players, rather than the contest score per se. We see from (2) and (3) that
the disadvantaged player k on one hand has a higher probability of being
inactive but that he, conditional on being active, exerts a higher expected
effort. This translates, by way of (4), into the following:
Corollary 1 The disadvantaged player exerts the larger expected effort of
the two if and only if
a <
2vz
v − z . (6)
6Note that, although (1) includes the possibility of a tie occurring, this will not
happen in equilibrium. Player h randomizes continuously on [0, v − z], and the only
atom in player k’s strategy is isolated at a level at least z below the score of the opponent;
otherwise, player k randomizes continuously over the interval [z, v]. Hence the highest
score is unique with probability 1, and a tie will not occur.
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This says that the laggard is expected to have more effort than his rival
when his disadvantage in terms of the value of winning is suffi ciently weak
relative to the prize and the leader’s head start. This is evident from (2)
and (3): whereas v and z affect the efforts of both players, a affects the
disadvantaged player’s effort only —the more disadvantaged he is in terms
of the value of winning, the higher is the probability that he is inactive.
Note that, if the players have the same value of winning the prize (a = 0),
then the disadvantaged player has greater effort in expectation. This is a
feature of the final contest in the sequence of T that we consider below.
These results are used in the next sections to solve and analyze our
model.
3 Sequential contests
There are two identical players, i = 1, 2, who compete in a series of T ≥ 2
all-pay auctions for a prize of v in each contest by making irreversible efforts
xi,t ≥ 0, t = 1, ..., T .
The probability of winning for player 1 in contest t depends on current
effort as well as on the history so far, summarized by the net number of wins
that player 1 has in the previous t−1 contests. Denote this byMt. Suppose
in particular that at contest t, player 1 has wonmt of the t−1 past contests,
and player 2 has won (t−1−mt). HenceMt := mt−(t−1−mt) = 2mt−t+1.
Without loss of generality, we shall assume that Mt ≥ 0; i.e., if the game
has a leader, this is always player 1.7
The parameterMt represents a head start, making it possible for player
1 to win the current contest with less effort. In particular, the score for
player 1 in contest t is given by the sum of his current effort x1,t and his
head start. The actual size of the head start depends on the net number
of wins, and also on how much this parameter influences the score of the
player in the contest. We model the head start in contest t as Mts where s
is the size of the advantage from winning one previous contest. Hence the
score of player 1 in contest t is Mts + x1,t, and that of player 2 is x2,t. To









7This is without loss of generality since the case where player 2 leads (Mt ≤ −1) can
be analyzed by taking the absolute value of Mt and interchanging the players.
8See Section 5.3 for a discussion of a case where this restriction is relaxed.
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The probability that player 1 wins contest t is
p1,t (x1,t, x2,t) =

1 if Mts+ x1,t > x2,t;
1
2
if Mts+ x1,t = x2,t;
0 if Mts+ x1,t < x2,t.
(8)
At contest t, the maximum number of net wins for player 1 is t − 1,
meaning that he has won all the previous t − 1 contests. If player 1 has
won all but one of the previous t− 1 contests, then his net win advantage
is t− 3, whereas the net win advantage is t− 5 if player 1 has won all but
two of the previous contests, and so on.
Note the parallel to the single contest discussed in Section 2: we can
writeMts = zt as the head start in contest t. Below we show that the head
start conveys an extra incremental value to the leader over and above the
value of losing in the continuation of the game, and this will be represented
by at. In the one-shot version of the game, these parameters are indepen-
dent, but we reveal below that they are interlinked in the dynamic model;
hence, a head start in a dynamic model can influence play through more
channels than in the one-shot case.
Denote by u∗i,t(Mt) the value for player i of the subgame starting at
contest t with a net number of wins for player 1 equal to Mt. Referring
back to the notation introduced in equation (5) above, we can write
u∗1,t (Mt) := π
∗
1 (Mts, at) .
For Mt ≥ 1, we know from Proposition 1 that u∗1,t(Mt) =Mts+ at and
u∗2,t(Mt) = 0. Crucial for solving the game with T sequential contests is
finding an expression for at.
For ease of notation, we denote in the following, for each contest t, the
expected effort of player i in that contest by x∗i,t (Mt), and total expected
effort by X∗t (Mt) := x
∗
1,t (Mt) + x
∗
2,t (Mt).
Consider the final contest T . Since there are no future prizes, aT =
0, and by definition zT = MT s. Thus, expected efforts and payoffs in
equilibrium are
x∗1,T (MT ) =
(v −MT s)2
2v
, x∗2,T (MT ) =
v2 − (MT s)2
2v
; (9)
u∗1,T (MT ) = MT s, u
∗
2,T (MT ) = 0.
Note that, from (9) — and in line with Corollary 1 — we can state the
following:
Corollary 2 Player 2 (the laggard) has the higher expected effort in the
last contest for any MT ≥ 1.
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If MT = 0, so that each player has won equally many of the previous
contests, then the game in this last contest is symmetric and we have
x∗1,T (MT = 0) = x
∗




u∗1,T (MT = 0) = u
∗
2,T (MT = 0) = 0.
Total expected effort in contest T is
X∗T (MT ) = v −MT s.
Consider next any contest t ∈ {2, ..., T − 1} in which Mt ≥ 1, i.e.,
player 1 has at least one more win than player 2 so far. Denote the mixed
strategy of player i in contest t by Fi,t(x), so that the expected payoff for
player 1 is
u1,t (x1,t,Mt) : = F2,t (x1,t +Mts)
[
v + u∗1,t+1 (Mt + 1)
]
+ [1− F2,t (x1,t +Mts)]u∗1,t+1 (Mt − 1)− x1,t.
That is, either he wins, receives the prize v for this contest, increases his net
number of wins by one, and gets a continuation payoff u∗1,t+1 (Mt + 1); or
he loses, receives no prize in the current contest, decreases his net number
of wins by one, and gets a continuation value of u∗1,t+1 (Mt − 1). Quite
straightforwardly, we can rewrite this as
u1,t (x1,t,Mt) = u
∗




1,t+1 (Mt + 1)− u∗1,t+1 (Mt − 1) . (11)
Note that, if Mt = 1, then u∗1,t+1 (Mt − 1) = 0, since contest t+ 1 becomes
symmetric if the advantaged player 1 loses contest t in this case.
Player 2 is at a disadvantage, being at least one net win down. If he
wins the current contest, then he gains the stage prize v. But even with a
win, he will continue as the disadvantaged player earning zero, or at best
— if winning at Mt = 1 —getting even, but still earning zero. Thus, the
expected payoff to player 2 is given by
u2,t (x2,t,Mt) := F1,t (x2,t −Mts) v − x2,t. (12)
If Mt = 0, then the game is symmetric; the winner of contest t gets the
stage prize and the continuation from being the leader, and the loser gets
nothing since the continuation payoff of losing from this state is 0. The
expression for player i’s expected payoff is then
ui,t (xi,t, 0) := Fj,t (xi,t)
[




In this case, the contest is symmetric over a prize of v + u∗1,t+1 (1) for each




v + u∗1,t+1 (1)
]
, (14)
with an expected payoff of 0. Since, by definition, M1 = 0, this analysis
holds for the first contest at t = 1.
Proposition 2 summarizes the equilibrium expected efforts and expected
payoffs of the T sequential contests. The proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 In a contest t ∈ {2, ..., T} with Mt ≥ 1, equilibrium ex-











2v [v + 2s (T − t)] (17)
p∗2,t(Mt) =
v2 −M2t s2
2v [v + 2s (T − t)] . (18)
and equilibrium expected payoffs









In a contest t with Mt = 0, including contest 1, equilibrium expected















u∗i,t (0) = 0; i = 1, 2. (22)
Note, from (20), that there is a hard fight to win the first contest, where
total expected effort is v + 1
2
sT (T − 1).
It is straightforward to show that the probability that the laggard wins a
stage contest in (18) is always less than one half; furthermore, the laggard’s
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probability of winning is lower, the more he is lagging, i.e., the higher is
Mt; and the longer is the rest of the game, i.e., the higher is (T − t).
Two factors play a role in determining the course of play: (i) the head
start that affects the contest score of the advantaged player, zt =Mts; and
(ii) the difference at in the value of winning and losing for the advantaged
player. As shown in the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix, the latter
equals
at = 2s (T − t) . (23)
Note that this value does not depend on how big the lead of player 1 is,
i.e., on Mt, nor on the size of the stage prize v. This latter independence
can be seen from Proposition 1, where payoffs in the stage contest are
determined purely by the head start and the extra valuation of the leader.
In our dynamic model, this manifests itself in (19) which is independent
of v. Since the expected payoff at each stage can be written in this way,
the difference between winning and losing at any stage is independent of
the stage prize. The fact that at is independent of Mt follows from (19),
which is linear inMt, combined with the definition of at. The continuation
value increases in both the number of contests remaining after contest t is
played (i.e., T − t) and the win advantage s. Whereas an increase in the
head start zt decreases the expected efforts of both players, increasing the
value of at only affects the expected effort of the laggard, and negatively
so, according to Proposition 1. Hence, the lead in contest t, measured by
Mt, reduces the expected effort of both players while the leader’s difference
in continuation payoff only reduces the effort of the laggard. Equation (23)
captures a subtle interplay between the head start parameter s and the
implied difference in the leader’s valuations of winning and losing.
The expected payoff of the advantaged player at contest t has a simple
form, as indicated by (19). In this expression, T − t + 1 is the number of
contests remaining when we reach contest t. Hence, the expected equilib-
rium payoff to the player with a head start is conveniently expressed as a
function of the number of remaining contests, the number of net wins, and
the size of the advantage per win.
In what follows, we shall concentrate the analysis on the expected efforts
of the players. It is, however, worth noting that the scores of the players
determine the contest outcome at each stage. Conditional on player 1
choosing positive effort, his effort comes from a uniform distribution over
the interval (0, v − Mts], which becomes more narrow as the head start
increases, and his score comes from a uniform distribution over the interval
(Mts, v]. Likewise, conditional on positive effort by player 2, his effort (and
score) comes from a uniform distribution on (Mts, v] which also narrows
as player 1’s head start increases. It follows that, conditional on positive
efforts, the two players’scores have the same distribution. Still, considering
the mass points (player 1’s point is higher and has lower mass), the expected
12












2 [v + 2s (T − t)] = x
∗
2,t (Mt) .
4 Keep on fighting
The amount of fighting (effort) expected in equilibrium is simple to calcu-
late; the expected payoff in equilibrium for the game as a whole is zero,
so that the players compete away the whole surplus. This leads to the
following Corollary to Proposition 2.
Corollary 3 Total expected effort over the T contests is vT .
Given this result, we are interested in how the intensity of effort varies
across contests, depending on the net number of wins, and on whether the
result of the current contest makes the subsequent one more or less even.
In a one-shot symmetric all-pay auction, total expected effort equals the
prize, here v. This is not so in our model. A contest with symmetry, i.e.,
where Mt = 0, is necessarily followed by a contest where one player has a
head start, since one player evidently will be declared the winner of contest
t and thus obtain a net win of 1. We find that the total expected effort at
symmetry is larger than the stage prize but that it is bound to fall in the
subsequent contest when one player has achieved a head start. Recalling
that X∗t (Mt) is total expected effort in contest t, we have the following,
with proof in the Appendix.
Corollary 4 For t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1}, we have (i) X∗t (0) > v; and (ii)
X∗t (1) < v − s.
Part (i) indicates the intensity of fighting. Note that it is the anticipa-
tion of receiving a head start that drives the extra effort; one-shot contests
cannot of course capture such a phenomenon. Part (ii) shows that the in-
tensity of fighting falls in the subsequent contest, where Mt = 1. Actually,
there can be symmetry only in odd-numbered contests: It is only when
t − 1 is even that the gross number of previous wins can be the same for
the two players at contest t so that symmetry entails.
As we advance through the series of contests, symmetry yields less ex-
pected efforts in sum. This is seen directly from (20), which is decreasing
in t. We have:
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Corollary 5 Suppose there is symmetry in some contest t ∈ {1, ..., T},
i.e., Mt = 0. Then X∗t (0) is lower, the higher is t.
Intuitively, the less future there is after a contest, the less value there
is to becoming the leader from the symmetric state.
We turn next to contests in which Mt > 0, where we are interested
in the extent to which a laggard will keep on fighting, even though the
opponent has a head start. Using Proposition 2 together with Corollary 1,
we have a central result in this respect:
Corollary 6 In any contest t ≥ 2 where Mt ≥ 1, the laggard has higher
expected effort than the leader if and only if
T − t < vMt
v −Mts
. (24)
From this we can conclude that the laggard in expectation has more
effort than the leader in cases where: there are a low number of contests
left (low T − t); he is at a large disadvantage (large Mt); the head start
parameter (s) is high; and the stage prize v is low.
These results reflect the findings in Section 2 above. When there are
relatively few contests left, the difference in valuation between winning
and losing, at, becomes small. The value of at affects the laggard’s effort
negatively but does not affect the leader’s effort, whereas the head startMt
affects both efforts negatively. It can easily be verified that the negative
effect that increasing Mt has on the leader’s effort is larger in magnitude
than the reduction in that of the laggard. Hence the leader slacks off by
more than the laggard is discouraged following an increase in the net wins.
The role of s is more subtle since it works through two channels. It affects
the score of the leader in the current contest directly, causing less effort by
both competitors; at the same time it increases at, which reduces only the
laggard’s effort. The larger is s, the more at falls in each successive contest,
which raises the effort of the laggard. Hence, although increases in Mt and
s both lead to a higher likelihood that the laggard will have more effort,
they work through different channels. Again, the interplay between the
head start and the leader’s difference in continuation payoffs from winning
and losing is apparent.
Our results are partly driven by the fact that competitors can win a
prize at each stage.9 The comparative-static properties of (15) and (16)
show that an increase in v will tend to raise the expected effort of the
9Strong discouragement effects for the laggard are typical of races without stage
prizes. Introducing a stage prize in a race mitigates the discouragement effect; see
Konrad and Kovenock (2009), a paper which is discussed in more detail in Section 6
below.
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leader relative to the laggard when there are many contests left, and that
the laggard’s effort will be raised the most in later stages of the contest.
Early in the series of contests, a leader has a great deal to fight for since
at = 2s (T − t) is large. Increasing v strengthens this effect. Later on, at
falls, giving the laggard relatively more to fight for.
Now we consider the laggard’s probability of winning a contest. Even
if the laggard eventually has the higher effort, his probability of winning is
always smaller, as we have seen. This mirrors the result from the one-shot
contest. However, we can show that the laggard’s probability of winning
increases in the contest after a win, and may increase even after a loss. In
particular, we have the following:
Corollary 7 Consider a contest t ∈ {2, ..., T − 1} where Mt ≥ 1. Player
2’s probability of winning increases from contest t to contest t+1 if he wins







2Mt + 1 +
√
[16 (T − t) + 1] (2Mt + 1) + 2Mt (10Mt + 1)
}
.
After a win by the lagging player 2, both Mt and (T − t) go down, and
so surely his probability of winning gets higher. But this can also happen
after a loss where player 1’s head start is increased to Mt+1. Then player
2’s probability of winning contest t+ 1 is
v2 − (Mt + 1)2 s2
2v [v + 2s (T − t− 1)] .
Comparing this and (18), we obtain the result in Corollary 7. We see that
such an increase in the probability of winning occurs when the stage prize
v is suffi ciently high relative to s,Mt, and (T − t). Low s and/orMt means
that the head start changes quite little after the laggard has lost a contest
(implying that he has relatively little to make up). When the number of
remaining contests is low, we know that this incites the laggard to effort,
as does a higher stage prize (since this is the only prize he has to fight for).
We can use Corollary 6 to discuss under which circumstances a laggard
will have the higher expected effort. Consider first short contests, where
T ∈ {2, 3}. When T = 2, Corollary 2 indicates that the laggard will have
higher expected effort in the final contest. For T = 3 we have the following
result:
Corollary 8 When T = 3, the expected effort of the laggard is larger than
the leader at t = 2.
When the series consists of three contests, the laggard will always have
more expected effort than the leader in the second contest, and also in the
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final one, should he still be disadvantaged at this stage. From (15) and (16),
it can be verified that the net win advantage, as measured by Mt, reduces
the expected effort of the leader by more than the laggard. Modifying this
effect is the fact that the winner of the first contest has more to fight for,
as measured by a2, which is zero when T = 2 and 2s when T = 3. Hence,
there is no effect on the expected effort of the laggard through this channel
in the former case, and a negative effect in the latter. In sum, however, the
expected effort of the leader falls more in such short series of contests.
The following Proposition sums up results on how the relative expected
efforts of leader and laggard develop for games of four rounds or more; the
proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 (i) Let T ≥ 4. For some contest t ∈ {2, ..., T − 1}, there
is a leader who has lower expected effort than the laggard, i.e., if player
1 is that leader so that Mt ≥ 1, then we have x∗2,t (Mt) > x∗1,t (Mt) for that
contest.
(ii) Let T ≥ 4. For t ∈ {2, .., T − 1} and Mt ≥ 1, suppose that
x∗2,t (Mt) > x
∗
1,t (Mt). Then x
∗
2,t+1 (Mt + 1) > x
∗
1,t+1 (Mt + 1).
(iii) Let T ≥ 5. For t ∈ {3, ..., T − 2} and Mt ≥ 2, suppose that
x∗1,t (Mt) > x
∗
2,t (Mt). Then x
∗
1,t+1 (Mt − 1) > x∗2,t+1 (Mt − 1).
(iv) Let T ≥ 5. For t ∈ {3, ..., T − 2} and Mt ≥ 2, suppose that
x∗2,t (Mt) > x
∗
1,t (Mt). Then x
∗
1,t+1 (Mt − 1) > x∗2,t+1 (Mt − 1) is possible.
Part (i) of this Proposition is an important result. At some contest
before the final one, the expected effort of a laggard will always be larger
than that of the advantaged player. In this sense the laggard does indeed
“keep on fighting”. The intuition is based upon the combination of two
effects discussed previously: the head start which reduces both efforts,
and that of the laggard more, and the reduction in the difference in the
continuation payoffs from winning and losing for the leader in the series,
which encourages the laggard as the game progresses. Eventually, the latter
effect is the stronger, and the laggard has the higher expected effort.
Part (ii) depicts an enduring laggard in the sense of not giving up the
fight. If at contest t he has more expected effort but loses, then his response
will be to have more expected effort than the leader also in the following
contest. The transition from contest t to contest t + 1 here implies an
increased head start for the leader causing him to slack offmore, while the
progression of the contest lowers the difference in the continuation values
of the leader.
Part (iii) can be thought of as an enduring leader continuing to exert
more expected effort than the opponent if he should lose a contest but still
have a head start. In this case, the transition of the contest from t to t+1
implies a smaller head start; both expected efforts increase, affecting the
leader more.
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Part (iv) demonstrates the possibility that success may “discourage”
the laggard. Here the laggard has the higher expected effort in a contest;
if he wins the contest and is still disadvantaged, then it is possible that he
will exert less effort in expectation than the leader in the next contest.
Parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3 can be combined to show that the
sign of the difference in efforts of the players is invariant to loss in the
following sense:
Corollary 9 Suppose T ≥ 5 and Mt ≥ 2. Irrespective of who has the
greater expected effort in contest t ∈ {3, ..., T − 2}, if this player loses that
contest, then he will have greater expected effort also in contest t+ 1.
5 Extensions
In this Section, we discuss three departures from the basic model. In Sec-
tion 5.1, we allow the win advantage to materialize as a combination of head
start and handicapping, thus departing from the contest success function
in (8). In Section 5.2, we discuss how the equilibrium would be affected by
players discounting future payoffs. In Section 5.3, we study a sequence of
all-pay auctions where prizes vary across time. Proofs for this Section are
contained in the online appendix.
5.1 Head start vs handicapping
In our main analysis, the effect of a win in today’s contest is to create a
head start for the winner in future contests. It can be argued that this is
a narrow view of such a win advantage. An alternative is to allow for the
win advantage to take the form in part of a head start for the winner and
in part of a handicap for the loser.10 In order to model this, let us replace
the contest success function in (8) with the following:
p1 (x1, x2) =

1 if bMts+ x1,t > [1− (1− b)Mts]x2,t;
1
2
if bMts+ x1,t = [1− (1− b)Mts]x2,t;
0 if bMts+ x1,t < [1− (1− b)Mts]x2,t;
(25)
where b ∈ [0, 1]. This case can be viewed as giving the win advantage both
an additive component, on the left hand side of (25), and a multiplicative
component, on the right hand side. In the terminology of Konrad (2002),
such an additive advantage is a head start for player 1, while the multi-
plicative disadvantage is a handicap for player 2. This set-up collapses to
10See Konrad (2002), Kirkegaard (2012), and Franke et al. (2018) for analyses of a
single all-pay auction with both a head start and a handicap.
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our earlier case when b = 1. The higher is b, the more of the win advantage
comes as a head start and correspondingly less as a handicap.
We impose the following restriction on parameters:
s (T − 1) < v
b+ v (1− b) , (26)
which is a modification of (7) to the present case. Note that, for b < 1,
(26) is stricter than (7) if and only if v > 1, and that it reduces to (7) when
b = 1. With this restriction, we can carry out an analysis parallel to the
one above; see the online appendix for details. That analysis indicates that
handicapping discourages the laggard when v is large. In particular, when
v > b
1−b , the opposite of Corollary 8 is true: the leader exerts the higher
expected efforts at t = 2 when T = 3.
5.2 Discounting
We have so far simplified the analysis by disregarding players’discounting
of future payoffs. Suppose, alternatively, that the players use a common
discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1]. The difference for the leader from winning and




which is increasing in δ for t ≤ T − 2 and approaches 2s (T − t) as δ ap-
proaches 1; see the online appendix for this result, as well as further elab-







Thus, we can add heavy discounting to the factors, discussed in Section 4,
that lead to the laggard having a higher expected effort than the leader.
5.3 Varying prizes
In the main analysis, we assume that there is a prize of value v in each
contest. Allowing this prize to vary across the contests does not have too
strong an effect on the outcome of the game as long as the contest prize in
each contest, denoted vt, adheres to a weakened version of condition (7),
namely that, for each contest t, vt ≥ s (t− 1). When this does not hold,
there will be cases where the leader’s lead will be so great that the laggard
concedes and the players exert no effort at all in one or more of the contests,
in line with part (i) of Proposition 1.
In order to explore the possible outcomes when prizes vary, consider the
case of T = 3. Let vt ≥ 0 be the prize in contest t ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Suppose
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Figure 1: Varying prizes.
the contest designer has a total budget of 1 to spend in total in the three







The equilibrium outcome of this game is illustrated in Figure 1, which
describes the distribution of prizes in (v1, v2) space; given the fixed total
prize budget, the third prize, v3 = 1− v1− v2, is measured by the distance
from the v1 + v2 = 1 line. Details of the analysis of this case are in the
online appendix.
We can delineate four areas in Figure 1 in which the game is played out
differently. If 1 − v1 − 2s ≤ v2 ≤ s, so that we are in area I of Figure 1,
then both v2 and v3 are so small, relative to the win advantage s, that the
player losing contest 1 does not consider them worth fighting for, and there
are no efforts in contests 2 and 3.
If v2 < 1 − v1 − 2s at the same time as v2 ≤ s, so that we are in area
II in Figure 1, then there are no efforts in contest 2. Efforts are exerted in
contest 1, mainly in order to obtain the win advantage and get in position
before the showdown in contest 3, where the big prize is.
If v2 ≥ 1−v1−2s, as well as v2 > s, so that we are in area III in Figure
1, then there is no effort in contest 3 in the case of one player winning both
contests 1 and 2. Now, v2 is big enough for there to be something to fight
for in contest 2, while v3 is so small that the laggard’s incentives disappear
in the event of a second loss.
The case of s < v2 < 1 − v1 − 2s corresponds to area IV in Figure 1
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and covers that of equal stage prizes (here v1 = v2 = v3 = 13) discussed
in the main analysis. Now, both v2 and v3 are large enough that a player
has incentives to stay in the game throughout, even if he should lose both
contest 1 and contest 2.
In summary, we find that the outcome of the game that we have dis-
cussed in our main analysis is relatively robust to variations in prizes, as
long as late prizes do not become too small. In particular, the assumption
in (7) can be replaced with the weaker condition s (t− 1) < vt, for each t.
Thus, for example, any v1 > 0 in the first contest can be allowed.
6 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we have examined a finite series of all-pay auctions that are
linked through time. Specifically, a player who has won more contests than
he has lost is assumed to build up a win advantage in the form of a head
start over the rival, and the more net wins the larger the advantage. This
way, we endogenize head starts and explain them as outcomes of previous
contests with win advantages. The effect captured here may be purely
psychological or experience-based, but may also be due to factors such as
sellers who gain more back-room resources, or researchers who get more
assistants. The series of contests has a symmetric outset, and we identify
effects overlooked in static contest models. Two effects are at work that
influence efforts of leaders and laggards. First, a head start leads both
players to exert lower effort in expectation, but affects the laggard most;
exerting effort will at best even up the contest, at which point both players
will expend many resources to gain the lead. Second, the head start creates
an extra value to the leader by ensuring easier access to future prizes, hence
reducing the effort of the laggard further. The relative magnitude of these
effects changes throughout the series of contests, however, so that, eventu-
ally, the laggard has the higher expected effort. We have also investigated
the subtle relationship between the size of the head start and the difference
in the continuation value for the leader from winning and losing.
Series of contests can be combined in a plethora of ways. It is instruc-
tive to compare our results with those of a race considered by Konrad
and Kovenock (2009). They present a rich model with heterogeneous con-
testants, but also allude to the symmetric version as an important special
case. By factoring out the initial asymmetry between players, it is possi-
ble to uncover the underlying mechanisms which drive behavior in our and
their analysis. The version of their model that is most comparable is one
in which a stage prize v is on offer in each contest, and the first player to
cross the finish line is also rewarded with v. Two players compete in an
all-pay auction, and the state describes how far away each player is from
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the finishing line.
In the symmetric version of their model, three scenarios are possible.
1) When one player has a large lead, the stage contest is one in which
each player fights for the stage prize v, exerting equal effort in expectation,
and competing away the value of the stage prize. 2) In a symmetric state,
the stage contest is an all-pay auction where each player fights for a prize
of 2v (the value of the current prize, and getting a lead for the prize in
the final contest). Intense fighting ensues and the value of the prize to
the players at this stage is dissipated in expectation. This behavior occurs
independently of whether the symmetric state is close to or far from the
finishing line. 3) The third type of stage contest is asymmetric in the sense
that the leader has a larger stake than the laggard. This can occur in a
state directly previous to and directly after symmetry. A leader who sees
that his lead can be eradicated (by reaching the symmetric state) has a
stake of 2v (the value of the stage prize and remaining the leader); the
laggard has only a value of v, the current stage prize, since equaling the
score leads to symmetry where rents are completely dissipated. Here, the
leader fights harder than the laggard to retain the lead. A head start in
this model can be considered a starting point at which one player has fewer
steps to the finishing line. If the head start is one step, then there is low
intensity of fighting, and the leader has the larger expected effort (scenario
3). If the head start is larger than this, then the whole of the stage prize
is dissipated (scenario 1).
Our results contrast with those of Konrad and Kovenock (2009) in sev-
eral ways. In the symmetric version of their model, the laggard will never
have a greater expected effort than the leader, whereas demonstrating this
possibility in our model has been a main focus. Only one type of stage
contest exhibits asymmetry (scenario 3), and here the leader has the larger
prize, larger expected effort and larger probability of winning. Hence, our
results from Corollary 7 and Proposition 3 have no parallel in the Kon-
rad and Kovenock analysis. In scenario 2 above, the players’efforts sum
to more than the value of the stage prize which is an important facet of
dynamic competition. Efforts at each stage are determined by the value
of the stage prize and the players’continuation payoffs from that point.
The amount that expected effort in scenario 2 is larger than the stage prize
is constant, and not dependent upon the size of the lead, or number of
steps left to the finish line. Our model also exhibits contests in which ex-
pected effort is larger than the value of the stage prize in symmetric states
(Corollary 4), but the amount of expected effort is largest at the outset
as the players compete for an initial advantage, falling monotonically at
later symmetric states (Corollary 5). Indeed, the amount of expected ef-
forts in relation to the stage prize can be large in our model, since there is
a large value to being the initial leader: considering the first contest, and
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setting s as large as possible from (7), one can use (20) to calculate that the
maximal expected effort approaches v(1 + T
2
), compared to 2v in Konrad
and Kovenock (2009). In our model, it may be the contest score that is
observable and not efforts per se. Since the score is a player’s effort plus
the previous number of wins, it may appear that fighting is more intense
than is actually the case.
The force that drives the differences in the models is the exact nature
of the connection between stage contests in the two analyses. In Konrad
and Kovenock (2009), players advance through a grid of states as the play
progresses and players approach the finishing line. At any current state,
the players may have a symmetric valuation of the continuation of the
game, or they may have asymmetric valuations (scenario 3). There are no
connections between contests other than the effect on the valuations at a
stage contest. From our Proposition 1, one can see that this reduces the
expected effort of the laggard only. In our case, the amount that the leader
values winning over losing in a stage contest is independent of howmany net
wins he has, as depicted by at, which is independent of Mt. This parallels
Konrad and Kovenock (2009) and is a feature of the linearity in the payoff
functions in each model. In our model, the history —as captured by the
net number of wins —determines the head start of the leader. In modelling
terms, this means that the rule for determining the contest score of the
leader adjusts according to the number of net wins, and how important a
win is (captured by the parameter s). This creates an additional asymmetry
between the players that is not present in Konrad and Kovenock (2009);
from Proposition 1 it is apparent that this factor reduces the expected
efforts of both the leader and the laggard. The interplay between these two
effects in our model allows for interesting predicted behavior depending
upon the magnitude of the head start that is built up, and the number of
contests that remain in the series.
We have focused on cases in which the laggard may be expected to
exert more effort and find this to be most likely when he is at a large
disadvantage (due to the leader relaxing), or when there are few contests
remaining (since the value of remaining the leader diminishes). Due to the
latter effect, the laggard will always be expected to exert more effort in
the final contest. We can also show that, as long as the sequence is long
enough (specifically, at least four contests), the laggard will be expected to
have more effort already before the final contest. Should he subsequently
lose in spite of this, the laggard will have more effort than the leader in the
following contest.
We have been able to identify various patterns of expected effort. For
example, the loser of an uneven contest will have more effort in the subse-
quent contest whether he is leader or laggard. Even a player who loses all
contests will be expected to have larger effort than the rival at some stage
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before the final contest. These results are in contrast to the race literature
in which a disadvantaged player will often simply give up.
We have considered several extensions to our main model to look at the
robustness of our conclusions. Whereas our main model defines the win
advantage as being in the form of a head start, we investigate an extension
in which the advantage may be a handicap, or a combination of head start
and handicap. The laggard can still have a higher effort than the leader
in expectation, and this is more likely for a larger handicap, paralleling
our previous result. The results of our main model are also robust to
discounting. Finally, we show in an example that the restriction on having
an identical prize in each contest can be relaxed, and that our results are
robust as long as later prizes are not too small (in which case the laggard
would again give up).
The latter is an interesting line of enquiry to pursue from a design point
of view. A contest designer may be thought of as having a fixed budget
to distribute in equal amounts over his chosen number of contests. In the
course of the series of contests all rents are competed away in our symmetric
model, so that the total amount of effort cannot be influenced. The timing
of efforts can be influenced, however. The intensity of the initial fight
depends upon the stage prize, the number of contests in the series, and the
importance of each net win in determining the leader’s score in the stage
contest. To the extent that the importance of a win can be chosen by the
designer, a larger value of this parameter will lead to a more intense fight
since there is a larger value to becoming a leader. A larger stage prize and
length of the contest series also leads to intense fighting initially. A contest
designer may have a preference for ensuring that an early loser has the
possibility of evening the score, so that the leader does not become very
dominant. Here Corollary 7 can be used, setting the choice parameters so
that a laggard gets an increased chance of winning the next contest.
Interesting design issues open up when we depart from our basic sym-
metric model, such as when the prize mass can be divided unequally be-
tween stage contests. Extending our model to account for heterogeneous
contestants and asymmetric prizes in stage contests are topics addressed in
our ongoing research; see Clark and Nilssen (2018).
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
The payoff functions for contest t are given in the text by (10) and (12).
Using (5), we can stipulate the form of the equilibrium expected payoff for
23
player 1 in contest t to be:
u∗1,t (Mt) = u
∗
1,t+1 (Mt − 1) + at +Mts
= u∗1,t+1 (Mt + 1) +Mts,
where the second equality follows from (11). Using u∗1,T (MT ) = MT s as
calculated in the text, we can work out the equilibrium expected payoffs in
each contest recursively backwards. This reveals the following pattern:
u∗1,T (MT ) = MT s
u∗1,T−1 (MT−1) = (2MT−1 + 1) s
u∗1,T−2 (MT−2) = (3MT−2 + 3) s
u∗1,T−3 (MT−3) = (4MT−3 + 6) s
For a specific contest t, this can be stated as














Working out the summation, this is rewritten in the more convenient form
(19) in the Proposition.
In order to examine the equilibrium expected efforts for the advantaged
and disadvantaged player, we simply need to identify the parameters in (4)
for each contest. The bias term zt is Mts, and we need to calculate the
difference to the leader from winning and losing the current contest, at.




1,t+1 (Mt + 1)− u∗1,t+1 (Mt − 1) . (A2)
From (19), we have
u∗1,t+1 (Mt+1) = s (T − t)Mt+1 +
1
2
(T − t− 1) . (A3)
Applying (A3) in (A2), replacing Mt+1 by first Mt + 1 and then Mt − 1,
gives
at = s (T − t) [(Mt + 1)− (Mt − 1)]
= 2s (T − t) .
Putting z = Mts and a = at into (4) gives the expected efforts in the
Proposition. Note that the expected payoff of the laggard is zero, i.e.,
p∗2,tv − x∗2,t(Mt) = 0. Using (16) gives the laggard’s probability of winning.
In order to verify (20), we have, from (19), that

































s (T − t) (T − t+ 1)
]
,
where the first equality follows by advancing u∗1,t(1) one contest to t + 1;
this proves (20).
A.2 Proof of Corollary 4
Part (i): With Mt = 0, total expected effort in contest t is, by equation
(20),
X∗t (0) = v +
1
2
s (T − t) (T − t+ 1) > v,
where the inequality follows from t < T .







2 [v + 2 (T − t− 1) s]
= (v − s)
[
v2 + (v − s) (T − t− 1) s
v2 + 2v (T − t− 1) s
]
< v − s.
Since 2v > v− s, the fraction within square brackets in the second expres-
sion is less than 1, and the inequality follows.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Part (i). Suppose that player 1 is the leader. The laggard has more ex-
pected effort if condition (24) is fulfilled. This is least likely to be satisfied
for Mt = 1, in which case the condition can be written as
t > T − v
v − s.
Clearly, T − v
v−s < T − 1, since
v
v−s > 1.
Part (ii). The laggard having more expected effort means, from (24),
that
Mt [v + s (T − t)]− v (T − t) > 0. (A4)
If the laggard loses, then Mt+1 = Mt + 1, and the left hand side of the
inequality for contest t+ 1 can be written as
(Mt + 1) [v + s (T − t− 1)]− v (T − t− 1) =
{Mt [v + s (T − t)]− v (T − t)}+ [2v −Mts] + s (T − t− 1) > 0,
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where the inequality follows since the curly-bracketed term is positive by
(A4), and the square-bracketed one is positive by (7).
Part (iii). In contest t, we have Mt [v + s (T − t)]− v(T − t) < 0, since
the leader has more expected effort in this period. By the leader losing we
get Mt+1 =Mt− 1, and the left hand side of the inequality for period t+1
becomes
(Mt − 1) [v + s (T − t− 1)]− v (T − t− 1) =
{Mt [v + s (T − t)]− v (T − t)} −Mts− s (T − t− 1) < 0.
Part (iv). If the laggard has more expected effort in contest t, then
T − t < vMt
v −Mts
, (A5)
by (24). If the laggard wins this contest, then Mt+1 = Mt − 1, and the
leader has more expected effort in contest t+ 1 if
T − t− 1 > v (Mt − 1)
v − (Mt − 1) s
. (A6)
For the inequalities in (A5) and (A6) to be consistent, we must have
v (Mt − 1)






v (Mt − 1) + [v − (Mt − 1) s]Mt
[v − (Mt − 1) s] (v −Mts)
> 0,
which is clearly true, by (7).
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